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Smaller Farms and Low  Income  Farms
There  are  many  kinds  and  categories  of "smaller  farms" in the
U.S.A.  These include  such  diverse situations as low resource  farmers,
urban  workers who  are  rural  residents  with  some  agricultural  activi-
ties,  and  counter-culture  persons  seeking  a  simpler,  rural  life  style.
From  a  policy  perspective  and  for public  policy  education  we  need
to distinguish  among these  heterogeneous  types and  be  clear regard-
ing their problems,  issues, or objectives.
"Smaller  farm"  as  used  in  this  report  is  a  euphemism  for  a  low
resource,  low  income  farmer.  We  are  concerned with  farm  families
whose  net  income  from  all  farm  and  nonfarm  sources  is unaccept-
ably  low  in  the  view  of  our  society  relative  to  their  consumption
needs.
By  federal  proverty  criteria,  there  were  1.3 million  farm  persons
living in poverty  in the U.S.A. in 1977.  The farm poor make up only
about  5%  of  all  persons  in  poverty  in  the country.  But  16% of all
farm  people  are  classified  as  poor compared  with about  10% of all
urban  persons.  Farm  poor  are  different  from  their  urban  counter-
parts  in  a  number  of  ways,  but  of  particular  importance  is  their
general  lack  of visibility  to  public  policymakers,  program  adminis-
trators, and educators.
Low-income  farm  families  live  in  economically  disadvantaged
circumstances.  They are largely nonparticipants  in Extension,  agency
or  community  activites,  and  life.  There  are  substantial  numbers  of
such  farm  families  in  all  states  and  in rural  counties.  Farm  poverty
is  not  an  isolated  problem  concentrated  in  a  few  states  or  geogra-
phic  areas  of  the  U.S.  but is  a universal  problem  and  public  policy
issue.
Farm Income  and Farm Policies
Many  factors  affect  net  farm  income,  including  farm  product
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phenomena, nonfarm work by the farm family, preference  for leisure,
and  so  on.  But  basic  in  determining  the  level  of farm  income  is  the
quantity and  quality of farm resources controlled.  Physical resources
such  as  land,  buildings,  machinery,  livestock,  and  operating  inputs
directly  influence  farm  production  and  income.  Human  resources-
the  skills  of  the  farm  labor  force  and  the  operator's  management
ability  - also  place  upper limits  on how much can be produced and
how much income can be generated.
Commodity  Price Programs
Public  policy  intervention  directed toward  increasing  agricultural
product  prices  and  reducing  their variation  dates  to  Colonial  days
in  America.  The  objective  of  farm  commodity  programs  usually is
to  raise  and  stabilize  the  income  of farmers  who produce  the  com-
modity,  regardless  of the  size  of their farm  business.  In that regard,
commodity  programs  have  been  effective,  but it is well documented
that  price  programs  which  base  the  payments  on  area  of  land  or
quantity  of  commodity  produced  benefit  the  larger  farmers  most,
both in absolute terms and relative to smaller farmers.
If target-efficient  public  policies  were  to be developed for increas-
ing  the  income  of  low  income  farmers  through  higher  commodity
prices,  they would need  (a) a system of graduated prices or payments
favoring  smaller  farms,  or  (b)  to  be  applied  to  farm  commodities
produced  only  on  smaller  farms,  or  for  which  smaller  farms  had  a
substantial natural advantage.
In  the  latter  case,  family  labor-intensive  enterprises  that  do  not
readily  accommodate  the  substitution  of  machines  or  hired  labor
for  family  labor  would  be  in  order.  Dairy  farming,  tobacco,  and
certain  horticultural  food  crops  may  have  some  of these  attributes,
but  in  general,  smaller  farm  businesses  are  not commodity-specific.
Low  income  farms  tend  to  be  smaller  scale  units  with  input  and
product  mixes  similar to the  larger  farms  in their region. As a conse-
quence,  aggregate  benefits  of  federal  programs  to  raise  or stabilize
commodity  prices have accrued primarily to larger farmers.
This  is  not  to  say  that  small  farmer  well-being  is  unaffected  by
the  commodity  price  level.  Using  an  example  from  the  Midwest,
an  increase  in  the  price  of  milk  by  one  dollar  per  hundredweight
may  increase  the  net  cash  operating  income  of a smaller  Wisconsin
dairy  farmer  $2,500  per  year.  This  may  increase  the  cash  residual
that is available  to him for family living expense, capital replacement,
debt  retirement,  and  business  expansion  from  $4,500  per  year  to
$7,000  per  year,  a  substantial  and  important  change  in  absolute
income  for him.  However,  his  larger  neighbor  will  have  gained more
than  he in absolute  income and the income difference  between them
will  have  widened.  The  larger  neighbor  may  have  the economic base
to  outbid  the  smaller  farmer  for  additional  land  or  other  farm
resources.  But  in the short run, the increase  in commodity price has
helped the smaller farmer.
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producers  of horticultural  food  crops  have  benefited  from  the  or-
ganization  of cooperatives  to pool,  grade,  and  market  their commo-
dities.  This has resulted  in  higher  product  prices  and, through group
purchases,  the co-op  has also  reduced  input  costs.  Opportunities  for
such  group activities may be limited to small producers of "specialty"
crops with currently limited market outlets.
Input Costs
A  second  factor  affecting  the  level  of  net  farm  income  is  the
cost  of  purchased  inputs.  The  payment  of  interest  for  the  use  of
borrowed  funds  is  only  one  cash  operating  expense,  but  for  low-
equity  farmers  it  may  be  a  substantial  cost.  It  is  a  policy-relevent
input,  and most of the legislation  proposed  in the U.S. Congress and
in  various  states  to  assist  farm  entrants  and  small  farmers  includes
subsidized interest rates.
The  recently  enacted  Agricultural  Credit  Act  of  1978  contains
provisions  for  real  estate  loans  to  "qualified  small  farmers"  at  3%
interest,  increased  after  three years to  5%  and  reviewed  at two  year
intervals thereafter to determine ability to pay.  Farm operating loans
at  5%  interest  are  also  permitted  by the act,  both loan  types  to be
administreed  through  the  Farmers  Home  Administration  (FmHA).
Compared  with  commercial  market  rates  of  1,0%  the  qualified
recipients  would  enjoy  a large  input cost saving  in  reduced  interest
expense.  For  maximum  loans permitted  to  small  farmers  under the
act,  the  first  year  saving  in  cash  operating  cost would  be  $19,000
compared with unsubsidized  credit.
Expanding the Resource  Base  on Small Farms
The  Agricultural  Credit  Act  of  1978  also  increased  the  upper
limits  on  loans  that  the  Farmers  Home  Administration  may  make
to $200,000  on  farm  real estate  and to  $100,000 on farm operating
loans.  For  the  eligible  small  farmer,  this provides  an  opportunity to
increase  his  physical  resource  base  and  thus  the  level  of farm  pro-
duction and farm income.
In  this  way  the  provisions  for  smaller  farms  in  the  Agricultural
Credit  Act  of  1978  address  two  of  the factors  that influence  farm
income:  (a)  reducing  input  costs  in  the  case  of  interest,  and  (b)
increasing  quantity  of  physical  resources  controlled.  However,  the
consequences  of  the  act  are  mixed.  Those  small  farmers  that  are
declared  eligible  and  do  receive  funding  will  have  a  significant  ad-
vantage in generating  farm income.
But,  potential  problems  and  adverse  consequences  from  the  act
involve  the  issue  of  horizontal  equity;  that  is,  persons  who  are
equally  disadvantaged  should  be  treated  the same.  A  loan  applicant
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completely  ineligible  for  a  loan.  This  means  that  loan  evaluators
must  make  decisions  of  critical  importance  about  applicants  near
the  margin  in  terms  of eligibility.  In  addition,  the level  of funding
for  the  act  has  not been  determined.  If some  eligible small  farmers
receive  loans  and  others  do  not  because  of  fund  limitations,  addi-
tional horizontal inequities would be generated.
A  second  adverse  consequence  of  the  act  involves  the advantage
given to eligible small farmers  compared with ineligible  small farmers.
While  the  eligibility  criteria  are  not yet established,  it is likely that
net value  of  assets  owned  and  the  established  use  of  conventional
credit  sources  by  an  applicant  will  be  considered  in  determining
eligibility,  as is  now the case with  FmHA loans.
Thus  a  farmer  through  his  own  efforts  may  have  accumulated
enough  resources  to  become  a  small  farmer  but  be  ineligible  for
assistance  under  the  act  because  of  his  asset  or  credit  situation.
Assistance  through  subsidized  interest  and  large  loans  may  permit
the  very  low  equity  farmer  to  leap  financially  far  ahead  of the in-
eligible  small  farmer,  who  by  his  own  effort  and  without  public
assistance  had managed to make a start on a smaller farm.
A  final  consequence  is  the  effect  on  competition  for  farm  re-
sources.  With  implementation  of the act  an  additional  set of buyers
will  be  active  in the  farmland  market,  i.e.,  small  farmers  who  pre-
viously  lacked  equity  and  credit.  This  additional  competition  will
have  two  effects.  First, the  market  prices  of farms and farmland  can
be  expected to  increase.  Second, some persons who otherwise  would
have  purchased  land  will be  out-bid by  the subsidized  small farmers.
Human Capital
A  final  policy-relevent  constraint  on  farm  production  and  net
farm  income  is  the  quantity  and  quality  of human  capital  invested
in  the  farm  business.  The  Extension  small  farms  programs  now
operating in  several  states  are  investments  in human  capital  through
increasing  the technical  knowledge  and  management  skills of partici-
pant farmers,  e.g., programs in Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Iowa, Missouri,
Texas, etc.
Because  of the  nature  of  the  need  on  many  smaller farms,  such
programs  must  be  intensive,  on-farm,  one-on-one  types  of problem
identification  and  instruction.  Subject  matter  includes  farming tech-
nology  and  financial  management  and  the instructor may  assist  the
family  to  become  involved  in  community  life  or  explore  nonfarm
alternatives.
The  beneficial  consequences  of  these  farm  training  programs
are  obvious  to  participants  and  instructors.  It is  clear that income,
attitudes,  self-perception,  and  community  involvement  of  many
participating  familes  have  been  enhanced  because  of  their
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cepts  to measure.  To separate and measure the impact of being in the
educational  program  from  all  the other  forces that cause  change  in
farm family behavior is a very difficult task.
It  is  with  some  subjectivity  that  improved  technical  efficiency
in  farming and  higher farm  income  are  cited  as consequences  of this
investment  in  human  capital.  While  these  beneficial  changes  are
expected  to  continue  after  the  farmer has  graduated  from  the pro-
gram, their permanence  has not yet been measured.
Vocational  training,  job  search,  and  migration  - changing  the
characteristics  of the human resource  and finding the best opportun-
ity for its nonfarm  employment  - is also relevant for small farmers.
Some  small  farmers  are  recent  urban-to-rural  migrants and entrants
into farming. They have decided that their well-being will be increased
by  using their human resource in a farm business. But there are other
small  farmers  who  could  increase their  family  well-being  by shifting
their  resources  out  of  farming  to  nonfarm  wage  employment.  For
them,  public  assistance  in  vocational  training  and  in  employment
search and placement  is needed.
Guaranteed Income-Implicit  Tax Programs
Now  we  turn  to public  intervention  for increasing the  income  of
all  low  income  families,  regardless  of  residence,  and  consider  the
consequences  and  implications  for low income  farmers.  This income
support  is  in  the  form  of  a  universal,  guaranteed  income  for  all
Americans.  Under  this  system  an  eligible  family  with  no  income
would  be  guaranteed  a  certain  level  of  income  through  a  direct
transfer  from  the federal  or state  government.  If the  eligible  family
works  and  earns  income, the transfer is reduced by some amount for
every  dollar earned,  i.e.,  the "implicit  tax."  At some  level of earned
income the transfer is reduced  to zero.
This  line  of  discussion  is  relevant  for  Extension  public  policy
education  for  a number  of reasons.  First, the  direction  of change  in
federal  welfare  programs  has  been  toward  a  universal  guaranteed
income-implicit  tax  type  of  system.  Republican  and  Democratic
administrations  in  Washington  have both supported this kind of wel-
fare  reform,  first  as  the  Family  Assistance  Plan  proposed  by  the
Nixon  administration,  and  now  as  the  Program  for  Better  Jobs
and  Income  developed  by  the  Carter  administration.  We  currently
have  in  operation  in  the  U.S.A.  a  univeral  public  program  that  is
used  by  the  participants  as  a  guaranteed  income,  i.e.,  the  Food
Stamp  program.  It  is,  in  effect,  a  guaranteed  income  (of  about
$2,000  for  an  example  family  of four) that is reduced  by  30 cents
for every dollar of earned income.
A  second  reason  for  Extension  public  policy  concern  about
welfare  reform  is  that  rural  people  have  historically  not  shared  in
public  assistance  for low income people,  in proportion to their need.
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have  been  lower  in  rural  areas than  in urban areas.  Federal programs
to  create  jobs  in  the  public  sector  to  employ  low  income  people
have  been  located  primarily  in  urban  areas.  Whether  by  policy
design,  lack  of  information  by  participants,  or  administrative  dis-
cretion,  rural  clientele  have  not  been  helped  by  federal  income
support programs in proportion to their needs.
A  third  reason  for interest in guaranteed  income  programs  is their
impact,  through  low  income  farmers,  on  rural  development.  Strate-
gies  for community  and rural development  often  revolve  around the
export  base  of  the  community,  i.e.,  what  goods  or  services  can  be
produced  in the community but sold  "outside." In this sense, govern-
ment  programs  and  transfers  to  alleviate  rural  poverty  act  as  an
export  base  industry.  Public  transfers  from  more  extensive  govern-
mental  units,  including  income  support  payments  to  individuals,
have  the  same  impact  on  development  as  an  export  base  industry.
Status of Welfare  Reform
The  "Program  for  Better  Jobs  and  Income"  (PBJI),  the  Carter
administration  welfare  reform  proposal,  was  introduced  in  1977.
This  is  a  universal  guaranteed  income  with  a  reduction  in benefits
determined  by  the  amount of nontransfer  income.  It would replace
the  present  Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC),
Supplemental  Security  Income  (SSI),  and  Food  Stamp  (FS)  pro-
grams.  Whether  welfare  reform  emerges  as a modification  of the pre-
sent  system  or  an  extensive  reorganization,  the  movement  toward
a federal guaranteed income is clear.  In either case, how small farmers
have  fared  in  the  past  and  how  they  may  fare  in  the  future  is  a
concern.
Eligibility and Benefits
Those  eligible  under the administration's  proposal include resident
aliens,  students,  single  persons,  married  couples,  families,  and indi-
viduals living together in group quarters.  Family composition and size
will affect the level of benefits received by a particular unit.
One member  of all  families  would  be  expected  to work  unless all
the adults  in  the family  were  either  aged,  blind,  disabled  or  a  single
parent  with  small  children.  There would be 1.4 million public service
job  opportunities  created  for  adult  workers  (with  children)  who
cannot  find  jobs.  One  adult  from  each  family  would  be  eligible,
and would generally  be paid the minimum wage.
Families  would  also  be  protected  by a guaranteed  annual  income
of $2,300  (for an example  family of four) that would not be reduced
for  the  first  $3,000  of  earnings.  Beyond  that  level,  the  implicit
tax  would  be  50%  and  the  earned  income  level  at  which  transfers
ceased would be $8,400.
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participation  attractive.  First, for any earned income level, the bene-
fits  under the new program  would  be higher than under the  AFDC,
SSI  and  FS  programs  it replaces. Also, the basic income  guarantee in
the  proposal  would  be  in cash, while it  currently  is tied to the bonus
value of food  stamps.  Removing  the need to participate  in the Food
Stamp  program as a condition for receiving benefits would encourage
participation.
Participation by Small Farmers
Small farmers  generally  have  little experience with federal welfare
programs.  Low  income  farmers  (who  are  not  aged  or disabled)  are
currently  ineligible  for  SSI  benefits.  Very  few  now  qualify  for
AFDC  benefits,  and  participation  of  farmers  in  the  FS  program  is
low.  Increased  numbers  of  low  income  farmers,  many  without
experience  with  any  welfare  program,  would  be  eligible  for  bene-
fits  under  the  PBJI.  The rules  and  conditions  for receiving  benefits
may appear complex to them and the procedures  for application may
seem  formidable.  As  a  consequence,  an inequity  may  arise  because
urban,  former  recipients  of SSI,  AFDC  or FS will  likely  participate
sooner  in  the  new  program  (and  the percentage  of eligibles partici-
pating  will  be  higher)  than for equally  disadvantaged  small  farmers.
Both  program  outreach  and  Extension  programming  could  reduce
this discrepancy.
Reporting Assets-A Problem for Small Farmers
Net  worth  is  an  important  aspect  of  economic  well-being.  This
is  recognized  in  some  current  welfare  programs  through  an  assets
test.  Under  certain  conditions  the program  benefit  may  be  reduced
or  the  family  become  ineligible  for  any  benefits  because  of  their
asset holdings.
The  administration's  proposal  in  its current  form  treats different
classes of farm assets in different ways:  The value of the dwelling and
its  contiguous  residential  lot  is  excluded  from  the  assets  test,  as  is
the value  of all household  goods and the first $3,000 of value of one
automobile.  Value  of farm business  (net) assets  such  as  land,  build-
ings, machinery, equipment, and livestock has no upper limit currently
specified  in  the  bill,  but  an  upper limit  will  likely  be  specified  by
HEW  regulation.  Farm  families with more  than  that limit would  be
ineligible  for any  benefits.  If they hold less  than that, the limit  10%
of farm asset value would be imputed as income.
The  key  role that assets  play in determining eligibility and benefit
levels  in  the  PBJI  may  be  troublesome  for  small  farmers.  First,  if
an upper limit is set on  farm  assets,  it may  make  PBJI  more restric-
tive than the programs it replaces, i.e.,  FS and SSI. Most farmers lack
experience  or criteria  for developing  a realistic  estimate  of the value
of  their  farm  real  estate  holdings.  Estimating the value  of the  farm
house  and  residential lot  apart from the remainder  of the  farm  will
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be particularly difficult.
Yet reduced welfare benefits or ineligibility may result from errors
in judgment or misinformation  in the asset valuation process. County
Extension  faculty  have  both  the expertise  and  the geographic  posi-
tion to  assist if this condition remains in the final welfare legislation.
Visibility of Low Income Farmers
The  farm  poor  are  a  small  subset  of the  total population  of the
poor.  For example,  less  than  2% of the recipients  of food stamps are
self-employed,  including  farmers.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  self-
employed,  should  be  excluded  from  guaranteed  income  programs,
but  instead  to  reemphasize  their  minority  status and  visibility  pro-
blems. Farmers'  unique characteristics in relation  to welfare programs
may  not  be  fully  accounted  for initially  in  planning welfare  reform
legislation.  It  will  be  appropriate  for the  Extension  service,  small
farm  advocates,  and  spokesmen  for  small  farmers  to  monitor  the
progress  of welfare reform  to  determine if proposals are constructed
so  that  low-income  farm  families will  receive  the same  level  of wel-
fare  benefits  and  achieve  equivalent  levels  of living as their equally
disadvantaged  urban  counterparts.  Evaluation  will  also  be  needed
when the proposal  is in  operation.
We  now  turn  to  the  Rural  Income  Maintenance  Experiment  for
insights  into  how  farm  families  may  respond  if  the  proposal  is
enacted,  i.e.,  the  consequences  of  a  guaranteed  income  on  farm
family behavior.
The  Rural Income  Maintenance  Experiment
Several  major  social  experiments  have  been  conducted  in the last
decade,  primarily  to  determine  how  much  less,  if  any,  the  poor
would  work  under  a  universal  guaranteed  income  program.  The
Rural Income  Maintenance  Experiment  was  one of these. Supported
by  the  Ford Foundation,  the Office  of Economic  Opportunity,  and
the  U.S.  Department  of  Health,  Education  and  Welfare,  it  was
carried  out through the Institute for Research  on Poverty, University
of Wisconsin-Madison.
The  rural experiment  began  in  late 1969 and ended with a follow-
up  survey  in  early  1973.  Its  primary  purpose  was  to  measure  the
effect of guaranteed  income  on the work  behavior  of rural farm and
nonfarm  families.  The  experiment  staff  was  multidisciplinary  and
involved  about  50  professional  researchers.  Research  objectives
included  measuring  the  effect  on  children,  changes  in  consumer
expenditures,  job search and mobility, farm production  and financial
management,  family  nutrition,  family  consolidation  and  divorce,
psychological  well-being,  and political involvement.
Two  counties  in  Iowa  were  selected  to reflect a relatively affluent
area  with  a  poor white  minority  and  one  county in  North  Carolina
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families  was  drawn from both areas and those eligible were randomly
assigned  to  a  control  group  or to  experimental  groups.  There  were
809  families  selected,  and,  of these,  220 had farming as a significant
economic  activity.  The  households  were  interviewed  quarterly  for
three  years  and  received  benefit  checks (if eligible)  every two weeks.
It  is important  that public policy decisions  be made using the best
information  available  about  problems,  options,  and  expected  out-
comes.  Usually  the  "best  available"  data  are  not  the  opitmal  or
ideal  data  set,  but  decisions  must  be  made  and  action  initiated.
In  planning  the  Rural  Income  Maintenance  Experiment,  it  was
known that the knowledge  that would  be  created also would not be
the  "ideal"  set  of information.  Technically,  the  findings  from  the
experiment  may  only  be  generalized  to  the  geographic  areas  from
which  the  samples  were  drawn.  But  the  results  of the experiments
are  by  far  the  best  basis  available  for predicting  how rural families
would respond to a universal guaranteed  income.
The  findings  are  summarized  in  a  publication,  "Rural  Income
Maintenance  Experiment,  Summary  Report"  published  by  HEW  in
November,  1976.  The  following  synopsis  attempts  only  to  reflect
the gist of what was discovered.
Work  Behavior. Both  the  farm  operators  and  their  wives  in  the
experimental  plans  reported  more  hours worked  on  the  farm  than
did  their counterparts  in the control  group, and off-farm  wage work,
particularly  wage  work  of  the  wives,  declined  relative  to  controls.
The extra time reported  spent on the farm  may not have  been used
productively,  however.
Total  farm  production,  gross farm revenues minus operating costs,
and  technical  farm  efficiency  decreased  for the experimentals.  Some
of  the  reported  increase  in  farm  hours  may  reflect  reporting  as
"farm  work"  all the  time  spent  on the  farm.  The  decrease  in non-
farm  work  by  spouses,  particularly  in  North  Carolina, suggests more
time  available  for  the  homemaker  role  by  the  spouse.  Changes  in
farm, nonfarm and total hours worked were minor.
Farm Product Sales.  The  experiment  was  found to have  partially
offsetting  effects  on  levels  of  crop  and  livestock  sales.  In  Iowa,
farmers  increased  sales  of  crops,  but  that  was more  than  offset by
decreased  sales  of  livestock.  That  is,  crops  that  would  otherwise
have  been  fed  to  livestock  were  instead  sold.  In  North  Carolina,
farmers decreased  sales  of tobacco  and  other crops.  These  decreases
were  not  offset  by  the  increased  sales  of  livestock,  so  net  farm
product sales also decreased.
Aggregate  farm  production  responses  to  any  politically  feasible
program  would  probably  not  affect  total  U.S.A.  farm  production
levels  or food prices to a measurable  degree.  First, the smaller farmers
in  the  United  States  account  for  a  very  small  percentage  of total
67farm  product  sales,  and  second,  the  reductions  in  farm  production
noted in the experiment  tended to be small.
Farm  Financial Management.  Among  the  various  loan  sources
used  by  farmers,  loan  companies  usually  do  not  provide  on-farm
supervision  or  farm  management  advice  with  their  loans  and  are
often  associated  with  relatively  disadvantageous  interest  rates  and
repayment  schedules.  In  Iowa,  experimentals  reported  substantial
reductions  in  the  amount  borrowed  from  this  source  during  the
experiment.  In  North  Carolina  there  was  a  10% increase  in  experi-
mentals reporting any farm loans while  controls remained unchanged.
Analyses  established  that experimentals increased their farm business
loans  more  than  controls.  Experimentals  increased  their use of both
Farmers  Home  Administration  and  loan  companies  relative  to
controls.
Other Responses.  The earned  income  plus transfers  to  families  in
the  experimental  plans  resulted  in  higher  total  family  income  than
for  controls.  How  the  experimental  families  used the extra income
may  be  of  interest  in  considering  total  farm  family  response  to
welfare  reform.
Among  North  Carolina  families,  a  study  of nutritional  adequacy
showed  experimental  families  to  be  in  a  superior  position  to  con-
trols  in  both  quarters  that  nutrition  was  measured.  The absence  of
an  effect  in Iowa  may  have  been  because  of a higher  initial  level  of
nutrition.
In  North  Carolina,  the  probability  that  a rural  nonfarm  experi-
mental  family  would buy  a home  was  higher for experimentals  than
controls,  with  no  effect  noted  for  farmers.  In  both  states,  home
purchase  came  at  an  earlier  age  for  experimentals  than  controls.
Little effect  was  found  in the use of medical care or self-evaluated
state  of health  by  experimentals  or  controls.  Farm  families  in  the
experimental  plans  spent  more  for consumer  durables than controls,
but were not different in regard to amount of consumer debt or open
accounts in stores.
Little  difference  was  noted  in job  change  or job search.  However,
use  of  the  Public  Employment  Service had  a high  payoff  for those
using  it.  The  infrequency  of its  use indicated  that rural  people  may
have had inadequate  access to this service.
Rural  nonfarm  families  in  the  experimental  plans  were  more
likely  to  move  to  another  location  than  controls.  For  them,  the
transfer  payment  helped  cover  the  costs  of moving  and  provided  a
cushion  against  the  resulting  short-run  unemployment.  Persons
interested  in  joining  the  urban  to  rural  migration  would  thus  have
a  cushion  to  help  support  them  in  their attempt  at self-sufficiency
under the  Administration welfare  reform plan.
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Commodity  price  support  programs  increase the income  of small
farmers  in  the  short  run,  widen  the  income  gap  between them  and
larger farmers,  and  are  target-inefficient  as a program  to assist  small
farmers.
The  small farmer provisions of the  Agricultural  Credit Act of 1978
would  (a)  significantly  reduce  interest  costs,  and  (b)  permit  sub-
stantial  farm  enlargement  for  recipients.  Adverse  consequences
involve  possible  inequities  in  treatment  of  eligible  and  ineligible
small farmers and increased competition for farm resources.
Intensive  on-farm  educational programs for small  farmers probably
result  in  lasting  improvement  in  technical  efficiency,  net  farm  in-
come,  and participation in community life.
Welfare  reform  in  the  U.S.A.  is  moving  toward  a universal  guar-
anteed  income-implicit  tax  policy  and  an  expanded  public  service
jobs  program.  Low-income  farmers  may  not fare  as  well  as equally
disadvantaged  urban  persons  because  of  (a) the treatment  of assets
in  calculating  benefits,  (b)  the  historic  low  participation  rates  by
rural  people, and  (c) the  historic disproportionate  dispersion of pub-
lic service jobs to urban areas.
Based  on  experimental  evidence,  farm  family  response  to  a uni-
versal  guaranteed  income-implicit tax program would include modest
reductions  in labor  intensive  farm  enterprises,  reduction  in nonfarm
work  by  spouse  and  head,  improved  farm  credit  position,  and  in-
creased urban  to rural  migration  by  persons  seeking  self-sufficiency.
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